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Abstract: Traditional monetary and economic convergence in accordance with the 
Optimal Currency Areas model has a number of limitations. Above all, it fails to 
assess the state of formal and informal monetary institutions. Adequate for an 
industrial society, it does not address the change to a globalising information society, 
being mainly quantitative, aggregated, and generally mechanical. This removes it 
from reality, though keeping it close to a quantitative presentation. It fails to take into 
account invisible threats to convergence and East European country realities involving 
informal monetary institutions and differences in institutional development. Monetary 
regime efficiency is judged solely by Maastricht criteria fulfilment.  
These limitations may be overcome in two ways. The first is to take into account 
the institutional aspect of money, enabling discussion of institutional monetary 
convergence. The second way is to adopt institutional monetary competition, allowing 
at least some institutional competition in EEC monetary regimes in the run up to euro 
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Today, convergence is at the focus of attention of European politicians, civil 
servants, economists, and researchers. European Union enlargement encompassing East 
European countries (EECs), and their eurozone entry in particular, entails stringent 
requirements for preliminary convergence: mostly Maastricht criteria which have to be 
met during the transitional ERM II stage.  
Among Maastricht criteria, only inflation and to an extent interest rates and 
exchange rates are strictly speaking directly linked to monetary variables
1. Clearly, 
monetary variables can be extended to include, inter alia, various money and credit 
aggregates, interest rates, and price indices. At a subordinate level, there are also 
institutional and organisational requirements with regard to central bank autonomy and 
administrative capacity. A tight interpretation of the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) 
model calls for a preliminary synchronisation of economic cycles and key 
macroeconomic indicators to achieve painless shifts to a common monetary policy (a 
common interest rate) and a common currency. 
In this respect, monetary regimes chosen by individual EECs are deemed 
(above all by the European Commission and the European Central Bank) appropriate 
and successful if they comply with the above criteria. This would be followed by 
synchronisation of transmission mechanisms across the different EEC monetary 
regimes, so that any future common monetary impulses from the ECB would have a 
symmetrical effect on individual economies.  
The acceptance of new members into the eurozone is viewed as being in the 
common interest and is subject to a general decision based on painstaking analyses of 
preliminary convergence. The EC and the ECB publish official reports on 
convergence, and numerous statistical and econometric analyses are conducted
2.  
Though the EU procedure allows a choice and does not exclude a diversity of 
monetary regimes, over time (partly due to individual choice, and partly due to EC or 
ECB input), the spread of EEC monetary regimes has narrowed. Today, EECs have 
generally chosen one of two monetary regimes, reaching a uniform polarity: i. flexible 
and active CBs employing inflation targeting; ii. static and passive CBs operating to 
currency board rules (exchange rate pegs and monetary base coverage). 
Representative of the former are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia, and of the latter, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and de facto 
Latvia and Croatia
3. 
I feel that convergence interpreted in the aforementioned way is most 
vulnerable not only conceptually and ontologically, but also from a purely practical 
perspective. Because its reference is purely quantitative and aggregated, and because 
                                                 
1 Indeed, it is hard to say which variables are monetary and which are not! 
2 Montenegro is a good example of euro adoption without preliminary convergence á la Maastricht (for 
some conceptual and technical details of unilateral euroisation, see Schobert 2003).  
3 Of these countries, only Slovenia currently (June 2006) qualifies for the euro.   3
past tendencies are extrapolated without regard to money's institutional and 
technological aspects, it could even be argued that such convergence detracts from the 
genuine emergence of a common European monetary area. Moreover, it may be 
argued to lead to growing disparity, as will be demonstrated. I believe that a new 
definition of convergence can overcome the above limitations. Such a definition 
should take into account institutional and technological changes, as well as the purely 
subjective peculiarities of consumers. Two critiques of the current model of 
convergence could be formulated. The first, 'from within,' extends the mainstream 
concept of convergence to include institutional elements. The second, which I see as 
more principled, proposes to replace monetary convergence with institutional 
monetary competition. 
In section I, the traditional view of convergence is  presented along with its 
limitations. In section II, the directions which an alternative conceptual framework 
could take in European monetary area enlargement are described. In section III, an 
attempt is made to identify some empirical evidence on Eastern Europe’s monetary 
regimes.   
 
 
I. Monetary Convergence and Eurozone Today 
 
Economic convergence is usually regarded as involving: i) convergence of GDP 
per capita, and/or ii) convergence of economic policies and transmission mechanisms.  
When common monetary policy and common currency are discussed in the 
European context, sufficient ex ante convergence across the cycles of individual 
eurozone economies and the need for transmission mechanism
4 similarity (to render 
ECB monetary impulses symmetrical throughout the eurozone) are stated as immutable 
conditions. It is claimed that otherwise (with divergent economic characteristics and 
transmission mechanisms), the likelihood of asymmetric shocks increases, as does their 
adversity, ultimately threatening eurozone disintegration
5.. This is said to be so because 
a common monetary policy could not offset individual asymmetric shocks. Almost 
nowhere, save for a few instances in the analysis of the transmission mechanism, is it 
acknowledged that the common policy itself could trigger shocks
6. This logically leads 
to the creation of specific buffers or absorption mechanisms (mainly market flexibility, 
                                                 
4 The transmission mechanism implies the mechanism along which impulses triggered by the central bank 
(mostly interest rate changes) pass on to economy: to real income in the first place (or the output gap) and 
price level. Enrico Colombatto proposes “…that a monetary regime transmits real shocks through the 
system when the standard is bad, but not bad enough to be rejected” (2005a, p6). When the monetary 
standard is very bad, inflation and reverse seigniorage occur.  
5 However confusing this may be, the sound theoretical ground on a positive correlation between levels 
and cycles is missing. There is a presumption that convergence in level requires convergence in cycle. 
This is because, when it is supposed that considerable trade flows exist, core growth is a condition for 
periphery growth. Yet, this logic could yield the opposite negative direction of correlation. The main 
argument for negative correlation is intuitive. Thus, as catching-up economies, EECs should have 
different cycles from those of countries which they are attempting to catch; otherwise they would never 
catch-up! Slow growth or recession at the centre could contaminate the periphery. Hence, it is unclear 
what the level and cycle relationship between rich and poor countries within an economic and monetary 
union ought to be. I am indebted to Enrico Colombatto for suggesting some of these inconsistencies.  
6 For a presentation of traditional OCA, and some recent observations, see the popular book by De 
Grauwe 2004 (2003), and articles by Horvath 2003 and Mongelli 2002.   4
economic openness, and the transfer of common funds etc.). This reasoning is in the 
overall spirit of classical OCA theory, where convergence is a condition for common 
monetary policy and a common currency. It is also assumed that the ECB is able to 
manage the economic cycle through interest rate changes
7.  
In recent years, opposition to the above views (styled Endogenous Currency Areas 
Theory) has been increasingly heard. According to it, convergence is not a condition 
for, but rather a result of, the single monetary policy and the single currency
8. 
Generally, however, ECB practice is still dominated by the old understanding of ex ante 
convergence (often limited to Maastricht criteria) and it remains the basis of EEC 
integration into the EU and the eurozone.  
What are the major features of convergence as understood above
9?  
First, convergence is seen as the mechanical and automatic movement of certain 
quantitative characteristics of economies. They are often limited to extremely general 
macro variables related to both volumes and prices. Volume variables include, for 
example, national income, monetary aggregates and productivity, whereas price 
variables include items such as interest rates, various price indices, inflation, exchange 
rates, and productivity.  
In this context, we may reflect that the idea of convergence as the process of 
bringing together certain variables resembles the application of classical physics and 
mechanics in economics, mainly resting within the model of general neo-classical 
equilibrium. This model holds that, given no state interference, internal forces lead to 
convergence among economic entities (individuals, groups, businesses, and nations). 
Convergence results from the movement of factors of production and income 
following utilitarian (marginal) principles. It is seen as the outcome of a perfectly 
functioning system free of restrictions. Transaction costs are nil; information is 
symmetrical and free; knowledge is perfect.  
Within this model, one could ask what would happen when convergence is 
obtained (equilibrium is achieved). Taking GDP alone, would all countries and all 
regions develop equally thereafter? What could trigger disruptions? Indeed, a very 
large number of questions could be posed in this spirit
10. 
Second, convergence is mainly quantitative; it is viewed as a set of selected 
indicators. From a generalised EU perspective, it does not take into account the 
qualitative features of different economies. Thus, could institutional specifics of 
monetary behaviour (corruption, crime, the shadow economy) lead to 'a convergence 
capture' in which convergence becomes the problem rather than the solution for a 
monetary regime? Following the quantitative path, convergence is burdened with the 
related conceptual problem of economic growth (see the concept of economic 
development as analysed by Colombatto, 2006).  
                                                 
7 This vision has been criticised many times by representatives of the Austrian School, within a more 
general philosophical context, in relation to the difficulties of economic policy, and within the framework 
of economic cycle theory (Mises 1980, Colombatto 2005a [2004]).  
8 For a survey of the approaches to monetary zones, see Mongelli 2002 and Horvath 2004. 
9 Three basic assumptions of this theory are not discussed here: i) the existence of the business and 
fluctuation cycles; ii) the possibility of cycle synchronisation; and  iii) the possibility of business cycle 
management by central banks and governments. 
10 Curiously, a similar trend can be found in Marxian economics, such as the equalisation of the rate of 
profit within an industry and across industries.     5
Third, and closely linked to the above, convergence is measured by artificially 
constructed aggregate values which eliminate specific time preference differences 
between money consumers and money producers within individual countries (in fact, 
such preferences may be culturally determined). Thus, a common price index cannot 
track the movement of relative prices. Due to their generalised character, aggregates 
cannot track the subjective evaluations of individuals (individual money demand) 
which are the very motives for monetary behaviour
11.  
Fourth—however paradoxical it may seem—there are two mutually exclusive 
views on convergence. On one hand stands a convergence which extrapolates past 
experience, is entirely past-oriented, and is strongly deterministic and inert. On the 
other stands a convergence which is entirely arbitrary, synthetic, and future-oriented at 
the expense of the past
12. Extrapolation comes through primarily in the quantitative 
aspect of convergence, whereas construction comes through mainly in its qualitative 
aspect. Both views, however, fail to take into account the uncertainty or surprise the 
future holds. There is no place for enterprise and individual initiative in this 
convergence; it is clearly an instance of large-scale social engineering.  
Fifth, convergence is managed and directed by the state. The state is seen as a 
large transmission mechanism free of private interests and operating efficiently to 
scientific principles. We owe this view largely (but not solely) to the fact that 
monetary integration models rest within the cost/benefit tradition of economic 
reasoning, with no regard to social concepts such as culture, politics, or ideology. Yet, 
transmission mechanisms comprise individuals and groups, each with its interests and 
goals; they cannot be automatic. Unless this were taken into account, the specified 
conduits remain sterile and remote from reality.  
Undoubtedly, to a large extent the above five features of convergence are 
conditioned by the desire to measure it in order to manage it. However, present 
empirical models do not produce satisfactory results
13. 
Sixth and last, the mainstream concept of convergence is rooted in the industrial 
and partly the post-industrial eras with their simple economic and social systems and 
slow economic processes. In the industrial world, physical accumulation was a major 
development factor; the state designated key industries and marshalled resources. The 
                                                 
11 It is highly probable that actual transmission mechanisms are entirely different. Thus, outward and 
purely mechanical convergence could conceal growing disparity and heterogeneity in micro behaviour.  
12 This concerns the 'brutal' transplantation of formal EU institutions into EECs without taking into 
account national institutional contexts (Garello and Nenovsky 2001). One example is the implementation 
of EU bank deposit insurance limits (20,000 euro per deposit) without considering EEC deposit structures 
and levels, thus raising moral hazard with all perilous consequences (for more detail see Nenovsky and 
Dimitrova 2003). 
13 Economists have developed various models for measuring convergence. For example, literature on 
economic growth (lately other variables) lists absolute (unconditional) b convergence (after the b 
parameter, which shows how a country’s growth relates to its initial income status) and s convergence 
where differences between the incomes of rich countries and poor countries diminish with time. A later 
(and relatively more appropriate) approach to measuring convergence takes account of the various 
structural features of countries (conditional b convergence). Here, countries' variables converge only if 
the countries are similar institutionally and structurally. It is also believed that convergence can be global 
(when the trajectory is identical for all countries) and local (when several trajectories are in existence). 
For details, see Nenovsky et al. 2005, 2006.   6
'managed convergence' model entails purposeful monetary and economic policies 
redolent of poor countries' attempts to catch-up
14 during the industrial era.  
Technological advance since the industrial era ought to modify the catching-up 
principles of mechanical convergence. Economic, social and innovative processes 
develop extremely fast, time and space are more compressed, distances are shorter. 
Information flows much faster and more cheaply than ever, and transaction costs are 
falling sharply. Forecast horizons get shorter, and extrapolation of the past is almost 
impossible.  
Central planning is becoming ever more difficult as the economy grows more 
complex (remember the critique of Mises and Hayek on centralised planning). The past 
is of diminishing importance as the path dependence principle gets weaker. The near 
future and the present are of growing importance to economic agents' decision making 
as preference shifts to the present. The more complex a system is, the more 
decentralised it becomes. The major requirement for economic actors could be 
expressed in one word: flexibility
15—fostering and acquiring qualities and abilities that 
allow quick adaptation to change, the capacity to grasp novelties, and an incessant 
willingness to learn. The flexibility of economic players is increasingly ousting the role 
of traditional resources, irrespective of whether they are material, financial, or other
16.  
Hence, the catching-up form of convergence makes less sense as starting 
conditions lose their relative importance. Today, it is no longer necessary to pass 
through all the phases of development; there is no need to tread the paths of others. In a 
sense, all countries are on the starting blocks at all times. Leaders can be displaced 
quickly. It is no longer a question of catching-up, but of pushing one’s way through, of 




II. Monetary Convergence: Towards a Broader Institutional View 
 
From the arguments presented above, it follows that EECs could be grouped into 
distinct categories. One way of doing so would be to see how appropriate a country's 
level of monetary and market culture is in relation to its monetary regime. More 
theoretical backing is clearly required, yet this could mean that, for instance, less 
developed monetary/market cultures and levels of confidence in money would call for 
less monetary discretion and stricter monetary regimes. Harder regimes would be better 
suited to countries with a high propensity to cronyism and corruption.  
One may presume that in countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
narrowly defined monetary regimes would be relatively more appropriate, since money 
users there possess a 'higher' monetary culture and greater confidence in their 
                                                 
14 This gives rise to a number of catching-up conceptual frameworks focused on state or banking sector 
involvement (e. g., Gershenkron 1970 [1962]). 
15 In fact, people exchange money in virtual space, beyond geographical boundaries. However, if 
aggregation (prices, monetary aggregates) is considered important, it ought to rest on a virtual principle, 
not on geographical or national ones. 
16 The disadvantages of resource dependent countries are increasingly discussed. It is often mentioned 
that a number of countries lose positions and suffer crises following changes in the prices of commodities 
from which they had previously profited (15th Century Spain after the gold glut, the USSR after the crude 
oil shocks).    7
currencies. Bad informal practice is relatively less developed there compared with 
Bulgaria, Romania, and to some extent Poland. In the latter countries, broadly defined 
(and externally imposed) monetary rules offering less discretion and generating more 
discipline and confidence would be relatively more appropriate. Such rules should, in 
turn, allow efficient monetary practice to emerge
17. For application of this logic, please 
see Table 7. 
Monetary convergence would thus come closer to its initial goal of being a means 
to an end rather than an end in itself. The main task a monetary regime should tackle is 
that of creating conditions for generating credibility in money and stringent discipline 
for as many economic actors as possible, for the sake of predictability and the 
soundness of contracts. It should allow a natural movement of relative prices reflecting 
the time and space preferences of agents. 
As already mentioned, the past has a relatively decreasing importance in today's 
open world. In a sense, economic actors, monetary ones included, make decisions based 
on an increasing 'institutional vacuum,' or 'less institutionally intensive space' 
(illustrated for transitional economies by Colombatto, 2003, 2005)
18. This means that, in 
a sense, actors are increasingly free of the institutions of the past and exercise their 
institutional choice subject to influence
19. The media, ECB and EU public relations, or 
academic courses in economics and allied subjects can impose the 'traditional' or 'new' 
concepts of monetary convergence as 'legitimate' and 'natural.' In this situation, the 
choice of rules of the game (entirely borrowed or allowing partial imitation) which 
EECs may exercise becomes a matter of persuasion.  
Within the scope of monetary order, besides formal institutions, there are informal 
ones, rooted in national culture and tradition and honoured extensively over a long 
time
20. Informal institutions play a role in the evaluation of transmission mechanisms. It 
does matter whether a monetary transmission mechanism crosses a fifth or half of the 
grey economy, or whether one can influence an economy in which cash does not reside 
in banks, or where the national currency is rarely used, as in some Southern European 
countries today
21.  
                                                 
17 In my view, it is relatively less appropriate to import institutions from outside (the ECB for instance) 
into such countries, since this would interfere with their own cultural and 'informal' experience. For 
insights into the institutional context in Bulgaria and EECs in general, see Koford and Miller (2006). See 
also Ialnazov (2003) on the differences between domestic and externally imposed anchors in the 
comparative cases of the Russian and Bulgarian transitions. 
18 This is not to claim that a world with no institutions can exist, but rather to offer a metaphor for 
differing institutional density. This concept repays elaboration; one line of reasoning may be to 
distinguish time cumulative from space cumulative causation (the former losing importance today 
compared with the latter). Another may be to research institutions as 'shared mental models' and theorise 
(on the basis of their empirically proven volatility and instability in EECs) that ramifications in new 
'shared mental models' are very probable. Such models are more easily manipulated by external or 
internal factors. Here I owe some critical remarks to Dimiter Ialnazov. 
19 For a theoretical and methodological discussion on the nature and evolution of institutions and their 
'internationality' and spontaneity, see Klein (1997), Khalil (1997), Kapas (2006), and Fiori (2006) among 
others.  
20 See Pejovic (2003), Sandholz and Taagepera (2005). More generally, monetary practice exists in a 
broad institutional context. The theoretical tradition which views money as a social phenomenon 
transcending purely economic meanings (Simmel, Knapp, Parsons, et al.) has become much more popular 
than sociology and anthropology (see for example Zelizer 1994). 
21 Monetary regimes include, inter alia, the gold standard, discretionary CBs, inflation targeting, 
exchange rate targeting, the currency board, monetary union, and dollarization. The range of informal   8
Here, the roles of the state and monetary authorities differ. The latter are supposed 
to foster confidence and discipline and not manage or manipulate the economic cycle. 
This could take place within the context of broadly defined monetary rules in the spirit 
of Eucken and Hayek.  
In some respects, the concept of 'conditional convergence' (see Footnote 13) in 
recent literature implicitly suggests that variables converge given certain commonalities 
between economies (approximated to GDP per capita). Some studies on monetary 
topics follow a similar direction. They assume that common monetary policy efficiency 
depends on the extent to which transmission mechanisms are associated with the 
characteristics of the financial system. One example is the study of the relationship 
between the transmission mechanism and the structure of the financial systems of ten 
EECs by Elbourne and de Haan (2006).  
Considering the institutional aspects of money could be only a first step to 
convergence. The next step would call for the question whether we are not too enslaved 
to the concept of convergence even with this institutionally augmented understanding. 
There are arguments for adopting at least some elements of the institutional monetary 
competition and free banking
22 model. Theoretically, this would require at least partial 
simulation of the spontaneous emergence of institutions to allow a transitional period in 
which actors can choose monetary rules.  
What could these abstract concepts mean within an operational, practical context?  
First, it would be efficient to have diversity and competition across the monetary 
regimes of individual EECs. This is a macro level. Each country could choose its 
monetary regime for itself, and determine the extent to which allow a wider (and hence 
a more stable) choice for its money consumers. Alternatively, it could select a monetary 
regime to help it with the three big EEC challenges: transition from plan to market, 
eurointegration, and globalisation. This is a way of offering the widest possible 
monetary choice to economic actors, a choice closely linked to the possibilities of 
accumulating knowledge and gathering and applying information. It should be designed 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions could cover popular practice in paying, saving, and lending (to the extent that national or 
foreign currency is used), preferred monetary or financial instruments, the extent to which banking and 
the financial markets are involved, et cetera. Thus, in Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia) a 
large proportion of cash for payments and savings is in foreign currencies; this does not pass through the 
banking system as cash transactions prevail; savings are in large denominations. Financial intermediacy, 
on the other hand, is mainly by banks, direct financing is less developed, and confidence in it is low. This 
stems from low public confidence in national money and the national financial system; other factors 
include the Communist past when the monetary system was meaningless, closeness to Russia (Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia), different degrees of openness to financial innovation (especially in payments), and 
susceptibility to corruption. 'Institutionally augmented understanding' of monetary convergence means 
that the qualitative features of convergence are of an essence which is hard to quantify. Nevertheless, 
recent years have seen attempts to measure the institutional characteristics of economic systems (and to 
some extent of monetary systems) in terms of quantity by means of indicators such as those of the EBRD 
or Heritage Foundation freedom indices. Most generally, then, 'monetary institutions' can mean the 
combination of rules, behaviour and routine which govern economic players in dealing with money. For 
some detail, see Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003, 2004). This also means that basic monetary institution 
rules ought to derive from the behaviour of consumers of monetary services (Centi 1984). With respect to 
consumers, we may discern two theoretical and practical approaches to convergence: 'from below' (from 
the choice of money consumers) and 'from above' (including from outside). It is logical that the wider the 
range of money and money services choice (the wider the base of the money choice 'pyramid') the 
stronger convergence can be.  
22 For a review, see Selgin and White (1994).   9
to prevent negative consequences from the power asymmetry between different private 
and public groups (stressed long ago by Walter Eucken); it could involve disciplining 
mechanisms restricting the power of actors and groups which could benefit from 
inflation and artificial changes in relative prices
23. 
Second, at the practical micro level, competition would imply allowing legal 
parallel circulation of the euro and the national currency (limited monetary 
competition). Since the different currencies are backed by different formal institutions, 
this move would also introduce institutional competition: competition among the 
institutional credibility of different mechanisms. In order for monetary competition to 
be both fair and efficient, legal conditions for the different currencies should be equal; 
they should both be officially authorised legal tender. In EECs, it should be possible to 
pay taxes, post prices and sign contracts in euro. Any artificial national currency 
monopolies such as having to pay taxes in it, (i. e., creating artificial demand for one 
currency) would be prevented. While competition between monetary regimes could be 
seen as macro level competition, here one may speak of competition at the micro level. 
Third, in a global context, the sole possibility of building confidence in the euro is 
to subject it to greater (extra EU) international competition. This could mean allowing 
other currencies (or at least some, such as the US dollar and the pound Sterling) to 
circulate legally within the EU, as well as allowing the euro to circulate legally outside 
the EU. Future currency competition will undoubtedly involve ever more private non-
bank money, and the monetary order will become more complex and sophisticated
24.  
The idea of currency competition in Europe has been proposed many times since 
Hayek's 1977/'8 essay. A competition mechanism between the euro and EU national 




   
III. Monetary Convergence in Eastern Europe: Some Empirical Evidence 
 
Armed with these 'institutionally augmented' theoretical concepts of monetary 
convergence and competition, we may attempt to describe EEC monetary regimes 
empirically. 
As pointed out, today EEC monetary regime effectiveness is measured in 
reference to Maastricht criteria. Table 1 presents the attainment of traditional 
convergence in EECs over the past three years against these criteria. Without going 
into details, we can conclude that only the inflation criterion creates problems. 
Hungary is an exception, having a considerably higher budget deficit which endures, 
unlike those of the Czech Republic and Poland which fell into line in 2005. Croatia 
                                                 
23 It is especially important to overcome or minimise 'step inflation.' There, injecting money (and 
concomitantly destroying money) involves redistribution among actors and groups depending on their 
money chain positions (attended respectively on the different changes in the purchasing power in time 
and space), Colombatto (2005a). 
24 It could be asked why it is necessary to put the two currencies into circulation in the particular political 
context of enlargement, when it is clear that sooner or later the euro will replace national currencies. From 
the institutional stability point of view, however, it is much more efficient to introduce (even partially) 
elements of free consumer choice, because the way institutions appear is important for their future.   10
also exhibits certain peculiarities. Looking at the Table, it could be inferred that any 
monetary regime type is equally suitable (or unsuitable) for eurozone integration. 
Indeed, these are the basic economic criteria for political decisions on eurozone 
entry
25.  
Forming quantitative criteria for measuring the state and development of 
institutions in general and monetary ones in particular is acknowledged as extremely 
difficult
26. Nevertheless, it is possible to find approximating indicators for sound, 
though incomplete, information.  
Over the past few years private and public institutions have begun selecting and 
monitoring indicators for measuring the development of formal (and partly of 
informal) institutions. Such are the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom 
(for the economy in general and for the financial system in particular) shown in Table 
4, the Transparency International index of corruption (Table 5), and the EBRD reform 
index (Table 6). In Table 2 we see the development of the financial system and its in-
depth aspect through private sector lending and financial market equity capitalisation 
to GDP ratios. Table 3 shows currency substitution
27. 
Without being too ambitious, it is possible to draw some preliminary 
conclusions (summarized in  table 7).  
We can observe the emergence of different groups of countries according to 
their institutional development (some authors speak of a “great divide”). Bulgaria and 
Romania, and partly Poland and Croatia, have the highest level of corruption and 
lowest level of economic freedom (they are the farthest from European levels, shown 
here by Germany). Accordingly, their institutional reform EBRD indices are the 
lowest. They also feature the highest levels of currency substitution and the least-
developed financial systems.  
Among EECs, Estonia stands out as the freest and most rapidly advancing 
country. As a whole, countries with currency boards perform better and have more 
favourable prospects of greater freedom and less corruption (compare Bulgaria with 
Romania). In them, the EBRD index also points to faster improvement (see index 
dynamics, Table 6).  
There is no doubt that EEC institutional differences are closely correlated to the 
forms and types of monetary transmission mechanisms which could lead to results 
different from those expected when entering the eurozone.  
Some dynamics can be summarised in Table 7 which shows the adequacy and 
appropriateness of different monetary regimes. I followed some simple theoretical 
rules which show that countries with strong and persistent informal monetary 
                                                 
25 But not lower than, or even higher than, the level of convergence prior to former EU enlargements 
and initial EU integration. Rapid attainment of nominal convergence is archetypal of countries with 
passive monetary regimes, and particularly of 'broadly defined monetary regimes' such as currency 
boards. Aware of the extremely static and partial nature of Maastricht criteria, a number of economists 
have gone deeper into OCA logic. They have conducted a number of econometric studies of cycle 
synchronisation between EECs and the eurozone (Brada and Kutan 2001, 2002, NOBE 2002, De 
Grauwe and Schnabl 2004, Suepell 2003, Bolle and Blessing 2005, Figuet and Nenovsky, 2005 are 
some). In general, analyses show that levels of EEC convergence and synchronisation are low. Only 
nominal convergence ranks somewhat higher. 
26 Concerning currency boards, see Camilleri-Gilson 2004 with its institutional index of monetary regimes, 
and also Ho 2001. For general discussion, see Freytag 2004. 
27 While analysing monetary institutions, additional indicators could be very useful, such as, inter alia, 
ones on the grey economy, banknote structure, the labour market, migration, and criminality.    11
practices and behaviour are suited to relatively static and broad monetary regimes, 
while strong formal institutionalisation of monetary practice rather calls for 
discretionary or narrow monetary regimes. A similar correspondence could be drawn 
from the relation between monetary regimes and the relative importance of the 
discipline and credibility effects.  
Clearly, Table 7 should be considered only as a source for future reflections (to 
start with, it does not treat the issue of causality direction between monetary regimes 
and institutional development).  Table 1. EEC Convergence to Maastricht Criteria, 2003-2005 
 
(%)   
HIPC Annual Data  
(Rate of Change) 
EMU Convergence Criterion 
Bond Yields 
General Government Net  
Borrowing (-) / Net Lending (+) 
General Government 
Consolidated Gross Debt 
   2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005 
Maastricht Reference Value  2,5  2,2  2,5  6,67  6,28  5,37  -3  60 
   0,7  0,1  0,8  5,78  4,11  3,35                 
   1  0,9  0,8  4,07  4,3  3,38                 
     1,3  1  1,5  4,15  4,42  3,37                   
Bulgaria   2,3  6,1  5  6.42  5.26  3,8  0,6  1,3  2,4  46,3  38,8  32,1 
Croatia   1.8  2.1  3.3  5.6  5.7  4.2  -4,6  -5,2  -3.8  41,5  44,2  45.5 
Estonia   1,4  3  4,1  5,25  4,39  3,98  2,4  1,5  1,6  6  5,4  4,8 
Eurozone    2,1  2,1  2,2  4,14  4,12  3,42  -3  -2,8  -2,4  69,3  69,8  70,8 
Hungary   4,7  6,8  3,5  6,82  8,19  6,6  -6,4  -5,4  -6,1  56,7  57,1  58,4 
Latvia   2,9  6,2  6,9  4,9  4,86  3,88  -1,2  -0,9  0,2  14,4  14,6  11,9 
Lithuania   -1,1  1,2  2,7  5,32  4,5  3,7  -1,2  -1,5  -0,5  21,2  19,5  18,7 
Poland   0,7  3,6  2,2  5,78  6,9  5,22  -4,7  -3,9  -2,5  43,9  41,9  42,5 
Romania   15,3  11,9  9,1  15.8  17.6  9.14  -2  -1,4  -0,4  21,3  18,5  17,1 
Slovakia   8,4  7,5  2,8  4,99  5,03  3,52  -3,7  -3  -2,9  42,7  41,6  34,5 
Slovenia   5,7  3,7  2,5  6,4  4,68  3,81  -2,8  -2,3  -1,8  29,1  29,5  29,1 
The Czech Republic   -0,1  2,6  1,6  4,12  4,75  3,51  -6,6  -2,9  -2,6  30  30,6  30,5 
 
 
The European Union    2  2  2,2  4,34  4,44  3,7  -3  -2,6  -2,3  62  62,4  63,4 
The European Union  
(15 Countries)   2  2  2,1  5,54  6,27  4,82  -4,9  -3,6  -2,9  39,7  43,1  41,1 
The European Union  
(25 Countries)   1,9  2,1  2,2  4,23  4,26  3,59  -2,9  -2,6  -2,3  63,1  63,4  64,6 
 
Sources: Eurostat and national banksTable 2. EEC Financial Development, 2003-2005 
 
Sources: Eurostat, Bloomberg, national banks
Loans to the Private Sector (End of Period)/GDP      Stock Market Equity Capitalisation (End of Period)/GDP    
                     
    2003  2004      10/2005        2003  2004  2005 
 Bulgaria   27,4  36,8  42,0     Bulgaria    8.7  11.7  22.9 
 Croatia   53.4  56.6  59.8     Croatia    21.1  31.9  33.9 
 Estonia   55,0  64,1  72,6     Estonia    36,9  48,8  28,7 
 Hungary   41,5  47,5  49,3     Hungary    18,0  26,0  31,3 
 Latvia   38,3  48,5  63,2     Latvia    9,0  10,3  17,0 
 Lithuania   22,9  28,9  35,4     Lithuania    25,7  33,7  33,7 
 Poland   28,1  31,3  29,2     Poland    15,4  25,4  32,5 
 Romania   15.3  17.0  20.0     Romania    6.1  14.1  19,7 
 Slovakia   32,4  31,5  33,8     Slovakia    9,2  10,7  10,6 








 The Czech Republic  24,8  36,9  46,6 
 Germany   121.6  118.3  119.0     Germany     39.5  39.7  46.1 Table 3. EEC Currency Substitution (Foreign Currency Deposits to Deposit Totals), 
2003-2005 
 
  2003  2004  2005 
Bulgaria  48.2  43.7  44,5 
Croatia  80,5  78.4  75.6 
Estonia  26,1  26,6  33,3 
Hungary  14,4  14.8  15.1 
Latvia  74.9  76.6  77.8 
Lithuania  25.5  24.7  25.9 
Poland  16.0  14.4  16.0 
Romania  42.5            41.2  34.5 
Slovakia  13.2  12,2  11.6 
Slovenia  32,3  34,3  33,4 
The Czech Republic  14.1  16.4  15.9 
 
Sources: national banks and Author's estimates  
 
Table 4. EEC Freedom Indices (General and Financial System), 2003-2006 
 
   2003     2004     2005     2006    
  
Total 
Score  Banking 
Total 
Score  Banking 
Total 
Score  Banking 
Total 
Score  Banking 
Bulgaria  3,3  3  3,0  2  2,7  2  2,9  2 
Croatia  3,1  3  3,1  2  3,0  2  2,8  2 
Estonia  1,7  1  1,8  1  1,7  1  1,8  1 
Hungary  2,5  2  2,6  2  2,4  2  2,4  2 
Latvia  2,4  2  2,4  2  2,3  2  2,4  2 
Lithuania   2,2  2  2,2  1  2,2  1  2,1  1 
Poland  2,8  2  2,8  2  2,6  2  2,5  2 
Romania  3,7  3  3,7  3  3,6  3  3,2  3 
Slovakia  2,7  2  2,4  1  2,4  1  2,4  1 
Slovenia  2,9  3  2,7  3  2,6  3  2,4  3 
The Czech Republic  2,4  1  2,4  1  2,3  1  2,1  1 
                 
Germany   2.03   3  2.08  3   2   3   1.96   3  
                         
Sources and comments: The Heritage Foundation; each country is allocated a score between 1 and 5 
for all ten factors, and scores are then averaged (using equal weights) to obtain the country’s final 
Index of Economic Freedom score. Countries with scores of between 1 and 2 have the freest 
economies. Those with a score of around 3 are less free. Those with a score nearer 4 are excessively 
regulated and need significant economic reform to achieve sustained increases in economic growth. 
Those with a score of 5 are the most economically repressedTable 5. EEC Corruption Indices, 2003-2005 
 
  2003  2004  2005 
 
Bulgaria  3,9  4,1  4 
Croatia  3,7  3,5  3,4 
Estonia  5,5  6  6,4 
Hungary  4,8  4,8  5 
Latvia  3,8  4  4,2 
Lithuania  4.7  4.6  4.8 
Poland  3,6  3,5  3,4 
Romania  2,8  2,9  3 
Slovakia  3,7  4  4,3 
Slovenia  5,9  6  6,1 
The Czech Republic  3,9  4,2  4,3 
 
Germany  7.7            8.2  8.2 
 
Source and comments: Transparency International; maximum index value is 10 indicating least corruption 
 
Table 6. EEC Institutional Development Indices, 2003-2005 
 
  2003      2004      2005     
 
Banking Reform 
































Bulgaria  3,33  2,33  2,67  3,67  2,33  3,00  3,67  2,33  3,00 
Croatia  3,67  2,67  2,67  4,00  2,67  3,00  4,00  2,67  3,00 
Estonia  3,67  3,33  3,33  4,00  3,33  3,33  4,00  3,33  3,33 
Hungary  4,00  3,67  3,67  4,00  3,67  3,67  4,00  4,00  3,67 
Latvia  3,67  3,00  3,00  3,67  3,00  3,00  3,67  3,00  3,00 
Lithuania  3,33  3,00  2,67  3,33  3,00  2,67  3,67  3,00  2,67 
Poland  3,33  3,67  3,33  3,33  3,67  3,33  3,67  3,67  3,33 
Romania  2,67  2,00  3,00  3,00  2,00  3,33  3,00  2,00  3,33   16
Slovakia  3,33  2,67  3,00  3,67  2,67  3,00  3,67  2,67  3,00 
Slovenia  3,33  2,67  3,00  3,33  2,67  3,00  3,33  2,67  3,00 
The Czech 
Republic  3,67  3,00  3,33  3,67  3,33  3,33  4,00  3,67  3,33 
 
Source and comments: EBRD Transitional Reports; higher scores are betterTable 7. EEC Monetary Systems 
 
Country  Formal Institutions (Monetary Regimes)  Informal Institutions (Monetary Customs, 
Practices, Traditions And Routines, & c.) 
Monetary Regime Suitability for 
Creating a Market Economy and 
Eurozone Integration 
Bulgaria  Currency board after a deep financial crisis in 1997   Weak formalisation of monetary practice, 
lack of market and monetary policy 
tradition, bad experience from the 1996/'7 
financial crisis, high level of currency 
substitution, large grey economy; high level 
of corruption;  
Strong 
Croatia  De jure managed floating exchange rate regime 
since 1993 (in some respects de facto currency 
board) 
Weak formalisation of monetary practice 
(despite some tradition in market and 
monetary policy), very high level of 
currency substitution and a large grey 
economy; high level of corruption 
Medium 
Estonia  Currency Board since 1999, in ERM II since 28 
June 2004 
Early strong presence of formal and 
informal Soviet practice (despite pre-Soviet 
hard currency traditions); high level of 
economic freedom, (including financial); 
currently well developed formal institutions 
and informal market practice 
Strong 
Hungary  Since 2001 Inflation targeting and broad band (+/- 
15%) exchange rate control  
Medium-level formalisation of monetary 
practices, some traditions in market and 
monetary policy  
Medium 
Latvia  Fixed Exchange rate (to SDR) till the close of 2004. 
Since then, euro peg with +/-1% fluctuation. ERM 
II entry on 2 May 2005, unilateral adherence to the 
+/-1% fluctuation band   
As in Estonia, early strong presence of 
Soviet formal and informal practice; a very 
high level of currency substitution 
Medium 
Lithuania  Currency board with an USD peg between 1994 and 
2002 and an euro peg since. Entered ERM II on 28 
June 2004 
As in Estonia and Latvia, early strong 
presence of Soviet formal and informal 
practice; a high level of currency 
substitution 
Strong 
Poland  Inflation targeting since April 2000    Weak to medium formalisation of monetary 
practice, some traditions in market and 
monetary economics, yet persistent 
Medium to weak    18
informal institutions; considerable grey 
economy; high level of corruption 
Romania  Inflation targeting since August 2005   Weak formalisation of monetary practices, 
market and monetary policy tradition, high 
level of currency substitution, large grey 
economy, high level of corruption 
Weak 
Slovakia  Floating exchange rate. ERM II entry in November 
2005, with attendant inflation targeting 
Medium-level formalisation of monetary 
practice, some tradition in market and 
monetary policy, liberal tax reform 
Medium 
Slovenia  Floating managed exchange rate. Entered ERM II 
on 28 June 2004 and the sole EEC qualified for 
eurozone entry in 2006 
Strong formalisation of monetary practice, 
strong market and monetary economics 




Inflation targeting since early 1998   Medium-scale formalisation of monetary 
practices, traditions in market and monetary 
economics from pre-communist period 
(redolent of Razin’s 1920s stabilisation); 
strong formal institutional maturity 
Medium  
 
Sources: national banks' websites plus observations from the very beginning of the post-Communist period with subjective valuations on monetary regime appropriateness 
in line with the theoretical logic of this presentation 
  
IV Conclusions  
 
Building as it does on Optimal Currency Areas theory, the traditional approach 
to monetary and economic convergence has a number of limitations. They relate to 
the failure to assess the state of formal and informal monetary institutions. Adequate 
for industrial societies, the approach does not consider the deep changes in 
globalising information societies. The approach is mainly quantitative, aggregated, 
and generally mechanical. This drives it far from reality even though close to a 
quantitative presentation. This opens convergence attained using the approach (and 
EEC development under the aegis of this approach) vulnerable to invisible threats 
from informal monetary institutions and institutional development differences. 
Currently, monetary regime efficiency is measured only by fulfilment of Maastricht 
criteria.  
A broader view over monetary behaviour shows it as highly probable that 
existing institutional diversity would have a negative effect when common monetary 
policy is applied. Monetary transmission mechanisms are not curves and formulae, 
but stages populated by actors with subjective preferences. In the same vein, one may 
cast doubt upon the theory of cycle synchronisation, which can never obtain in 
practice. It is also highly dubious whether catching-up countries ought to have the 
same preferences as those they are catching (aside from any debate on the very 
concept of catching-up and the existence of the business cycle
28). 
I propose that the limitations of the current convergence approach be overcome 
in two ways. The first involves incorporating the institutional characteristics of 
money into the approach. One could then discuss institutional monetary convergence. 
The second, and preferable according to me, involves adopting a form of institutional 
monetary competition. In practice this means subjecting EEC monetary regimes to 
partial institutional competition, at least before euro adoption. It would be possible for 
the euro to circulate in parallel with national currencies during this period.  
Re-establishing and boosting competition at all EEC and EU levels is necessary 
not only from the theoretical, but also the practical perspective. At the macro level 
this would involve competition between different EEC monetary regimes. At the low 
level, it would involve parallel circulation of the euro and national currencies.  
The two proposals would broaden monetary choice, allowing for more 
confidence and discipline because of rule selection
29. Convergence becomes 
secondary and unimportant; what matters is competition and consumer choice. Only 
competition can enable monetary institutions to follow growing economic complexity 
and stratification. Given parallel circulation between the euro and EEC national 
currencies, all technical questions about loss of seigniorage, lack of lender of last 








                                                 
28 See for more details Garrison (1989). 
29 Competition could stretch the discipline of the two banks issuing money. Practice shows that 
countries with broader monetary regimes (e. g. currency boards) allowing greater monetary choice obtain 
better results.    20
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